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Fast secure random number generation is es-
sential for high-speed encrypted communication,
and is the backbone of information security.
Generation of truly random numbers depends on
the intrinsic randomness of the process used and
is usually limited by electronic bandwidth and
signal processing data rates. Here we use a mul-
tiplexing scheme to create a fast quantum ran-
dom number generator structurally tailored to
encryption for distributed computing, and high
bit-rate data transfer. We use vacuum fluctua-
tions measured by seven homodyne detectors as
quantum randomness sources, multiplexed using
a single integrated optical device. We obtain a
real-time random number generation rate of 3.08
Gbit/s, from only 27.5 MHz of sampled detector
bandwidth. Furthermore, we take advantage of
the multiplexed nature of our system to demon-
strate an unseeded strong extractor with a gen-
eration rate of 26 Mbit/s.
1 Introduction
Information security[1] is a foundation of modern infras-
tructure with quantum optics set to play a prevalent role
in the next generation of cryptographic hardware[2].
Randomness is a core resource for cryptography and
considerable effort has gone into making systems suit-
able for supplying high bit rate streams of random bits.
The randomness properties of the source have a pro-
found effect on the security of the encryption, with sev-
eral examples of compromised security from an attack
on the random number generator [3–5]. In this area,
quantum optics has provided advantages over previ-
ous methods, enabling random number generation with
high speeds and enhanced security [6–8].
The gold standard for security in random number
generators comes from device independent quantum
random number generators (QRNGs) [9], where the
output is certified as random regardless of the level of
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trust in the generator. These generators require an ex-
perimental violation of a Bell-type inequality, an ex-
tremely difficult task, limiting generation rates to well
below practical requirements (<kbit/s) [10, 11]. Other
approaches based on the Kochen-Specker theorem to
prove value indefiniteness of the measurement, have
demonstrated faster but not yet usable generation rates
(25kbit/s) [12, 13]. Recent advances[14] have built upon
the notion of Bell inequality violations using device in-
dependent quantum random number generators. Re-
markably, these allow the closure of any security loop-
holes related to the how the device is made, i.e., in-
dependent of the device implementations. Currently,
high-speed (Mbit/s-Tbit/s) quantum random number
generation relies on trusted or semi-trusted generators,
where the independence of the randomness from classi-
cal noise is experimentally tested [15–22]. While these
systems have no quantum physical guarantee of their
randomness, they are usually denoted as QRNGs due to
the quantum mechanical origin of the randomness. This
trade-off between speed and security is mostly caused
by the experimental complexity of fully secure imple-
mentations.
Entropy sources sufficient for randomness generation
rates up to 1.2Tb/s have been demonstrated[23], How-
ever, these systems are not capable of real time ran-
dom number generation at full speed due to process-
ing bandwidth limitations, instead performing off-line
processing on captured data to generate randomness.
Thus these schemes are not suited for providing high-
speed random numbers for cryptography. Regardless of
generation procedure, implementations of randomness
extraction are limited by electronic logic speeds or de-
tection bandwidths. Therefore, for high speed real time
random number generation, the most feasible solution
is to create many parallel sources with lower entropy
rates.
Multiplexed quantum random number generation has
previously been theoretically proposed as a solution
to post-processing bottlenecks in the real-time rate of
QRNGs [7, 8]. Previous demonstrations of a parallel
nature remain focused on increasing single-channel data
rates. Gra¨fe et al. extend single photon path-encoding
based QRNGs to the multi-mode case increasing the bi-
trate for a fixed measured photon flux[24]. Haw et al.
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sample two separate frequency slices of their homodyne
detector bandwidth in a vacuum fluctuation QRNG,
enabling them to generate randomness at twice their
digitization rate[25]. Both demonstrations remain ul-
timately rate-limited by generation[24] or detection[25]
rates. The goal of multiplexing should be to increase
the data rate regardless of single channel bandwidth
limitations as shown by IDQuantique by multiplexing
together four separate devices on a single interface[26].
A multiplexing architecture is more versatile than in-
creasing the rate of a single data stream, allowing the
use of more complex extraction techniques and random-
ness distribution at rates faster than a single channel
capacity. Randomness extractors are algorithms which,
given a bit string from a weakly random physical source,
produce a shorter sequence of truly random bits[27].
Previous works have largely used seeded extractors,
which require a uniform random seed to convert the in-
put to random bits. Such extraction is often described
as randomness expansion, as it cannot extract true ran-
domness without already having some at the input[6].
Seeded extractors rely on the uniformity of the seed and
independence of the output from this seed for security.
We can relax both of these requirements with a multi-
source extractor.
A single random output is produced from two weakly
random inputs in a multi-source extractor. The main
advantage of this approach is that random numbers can
be generated without any initial random seed. Many
examples of multi-source extractors exist that allow for
unseeded extraction with low entropy loss, including
constructions which are strong extractors in the pres-
ence of quantum side information[28].
We experimentally demonstrate a high-speed paral-
lel quantum random generator whose total rate is not
limited by generation or detection rates but rather by
the number of parallel channels used. While Gbps
real-time generation rates have been previously been
demonstrated[29–31], our scheme provides a simple
method scheme to overcome electronic and processing
bandwidth limitations.
2 Random Number Generation Scheme
A schematic of the multiplexed QRNG scheme is shown
in Figure 1. The noise source of each channel of our mul-
tiplexed design comes from homodyne measurements
of vacuum state [15, 32] (see inset in Figure 2(a)). A
laser is sent onto a 50-50 beamsplitter while vacuum en-
ters the other port, subsequently the two outputs of the
beamsplitter are detected on two photodiodes and the
difference between the two photocurrents is amplified.
The homodyne current is proportional to a measure-
ment of the quadrature operator of the vacuum state,
and its value is independent and unpredictable within
a Gaussian distribution with zero mean.
Figure 1: Scheme for multiplexed quantum random number
generator based on quadrature measurements of the vacuum
state. A low noise, Koheras Boostik laser at 1550nm is cou-
pled in and out of a lithium niobate waveguide network through
butt-coupled fiber arrays. Light from the outputs is sent into
seven homodyne detectors. The detector signals are sent to the
ADC and FPGA for digitization, processing and randomness ex-
traction. This schematic shows four channels, the experimental
implementation used up to seven channels.
The homodyne detectors (HDs) used in this demon-
stration follow the design of Kumar et al.[33] and
have an electronic bandwidth of 100MHz. The quan-
tum efficiencies of the photodiodes used (PD20, oe-
market) are >67% (70% typical). The quantum signal
to classical noise ratio (QCNR) is defined as QCNR=
10 log10(σ2Q/σ2E) where σ2Q is the quantum noise vari-
ance, and σ2E is the classical noise variance. Using
the equation σ2Q = σ2M − σ2E , QCNR can be calculated
from experimental measurement of the variance of the
output of the homodyne detector with the local oscil-
lator off (σ2E), and with the local oscillator on (σ
2
M ).
Figure 2(a) shows the results for all seven homodyne
detectors. We see that for all channels of our design
this ratio exceeds 10dB across 30 MHz, with a mea-
sured common mode rejection ratio of >27dB across
all seven detectors. To confirm that our detectors were
measuring vacuum fluctuations, we determine the lin-
earity of the noise as a function of the laser power (see
Figure 2(b)). As the QCNR is the ratio between this
response and the value at zero power (blue trace), it
also scales linearly with input power. The indepen-
dence of the outcomes of each of the channels was veri-
fied from cross-correlation measurements shown in Fig-
ure 2(c). The cross-correlation for ideal uniform data
is 1/
√
n = 3.16 × 10−4. All 21 channel pairing cross-
correlations lie between 2.83× 10−4 and 3.51× 10−4.
Integrated optics provides a compact and stable way
to implement the set of beamsplitters needed to feed
many homodyne detectors. We fabricate a 1:32 mul-
tiplexer using annealed proton exchanged waveguides
in lithium niobate with a device footprint of 60mm x
5mm[34]. The device has insertion losses of ≈7 dB
(≈22dB total loss per channel) and we choose balanced
outputs to send to the seven homodyne detectors. To-
tal input power to the array is approximately 160mW
(≈1mW per channel at output), which will ultimately
limit the maximum number of channels. This limitation
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may be overcome by using several multiplexed lasers as
the input. Our choice of lithium niobate is designed
for a semi-integrated system, where a compact butter-
fly diode laser, the waveguide device, a butt coupled
linear photodiode array, and all the electronics could
be housed on a single circuit board.
Several data processing steps are implemented in or-
der to transform the analog signals from the homodyne
detectors into a stream of random bits (see Fig. 1).
First, the analog output of each detector is digitized
into 12 bits per sample using an analog to digital con-
verter (ADC, Texas Instruments ADS5295EVM). In our
demonstration no anti-aliasing filter is used and as such
frequencies higher than the detection bandwidth con-
tribute to the signal. The digitized results from each
outcome are sent in parallel into a field programmable
gate array (FPGA, Altera Arria II GX Development
Kit) for the remainder of the randomness extraction
protocols. If the outputs are to be multiplexed back to-
gether rather than used in parallel, multiplexing occurs
after the randomness extractor. Multiplexing is done
by interleaving channel by channel and the output of
the extractors is written to the on-chip memory of the
FPGA and may be transferred to a computer via a USB
cable for randomness testing. Randomness verification
tests are performed off-line by transferring experimental
data to a PC. In any application the memory connected
to the FPGA is equally suited to storing and sending
the randomness as the memory of a PC.
Three different extraction methods are demonstrated
that convert the unpredictable measurement outcomes
of the homodyne detectors into random bit streams. In
the first extractor (A), which we call ‘raw bit extraction,
we take the eight least significant bits (LSBs) from the
ADC and discard the remaining 4 bits per sample. This
extractor follows the design of the ’environmental im-
munity’ procedure of [35]. This extractor is designed
to minimise the influence of the classical noise on the
output signal. Demonstration of the security of this
protocol is through the high entropy of the experimen-
tal output, rather than from any theoretical proof.
The second extractor (B) is based on the second draft
of NIST Special Publication 800-90B[36]. The authors
list a set of vetted randomness extractors, one of which
is the keyed algorithm CMAC (Cipher-based Message
Authentication Code)[37] with the AES (Advanced En-
cryption Standard)[38] block cipher. For an input with
k bits of min-entropy i.e., one where the maximum prob-
ability of any outcome is bounded by 2k , when ≤ k/2
bits are taken from the 128 bit output of the extractor,
full-entropy output bits are produced [36]. The remain-
ing b128 − k/2c bits are used to refresh the seed. We
take eight LSBs from sixteen consecutive digitization
samples to form the 128-bit input to each run of the
extractor. The AES hash is implemented on the FPGA
using the TinyAES core[39].
The third extractor(C) takes advantage of the fact
Figure 2: (a) Quantum to classical noise ratio (QCNR) of all
seven homodyne detectors used, with inset showing a schematic
description of a homodyne detector, orange hemispheres rep-
resent photodiodes. Power used is 1mW and all powers are
measured at the output of the waveguide device. (b) Linearity
of homodyne detector response with increasing local oscilla-
tor power, shown using a representative (channel 4). Blue -
0µW, orange -200µW, yellow - 400µW, purple - 600µW, green
- 800µW. Inset, a plot of the linear response at 5MHz. (c) The
largest positive (blue) and negative (red) correlations between
any pairwise combinations of eight-bit encoded homodyne mea-
surements from the seven channels. The green line represents
the ideal value for the size of the data set (10 million samples).
that we have many independent sources, and as such
can use a multi-source extractor. Examples of both
weak (seed-dependent, non-reusable seed) and strong
(seed-independent, reusable seed) extractors have been
shown for QRNGs. The security of these extractors
relies on the quality of the previously created random
seed. Multi-source extractors discard the necessity for a
truly random seed. Instead, they take two or more par-
tially random bit-strings from weak randomness sources
and produce a truly random output. Given sufficient
randomness of the inputs, a strong multi source extrac-
tor outputs bits that are uncorrelated with any of the
inputs, providing randomness even with full knowledge
of all but one of the inputs. We implement a single bit
two-source extractor, as described in [40], which pro-
duces a uniform output providing at least one of the
inputs has more min-entropy than the output number
of bits. Each extractor takes two 36-bit strings from two
different homodyne detectors, each consisting of three
12-bit samples. As such we need an even number of
input channels for this extractor, and using six of the
detectors we create three of these extractors and multi-
plex the outputs together.
3 Entropy Source Evaluation
We first evaluate the worst-case conditional min-
entropy of the 12-bit output of the ADC for each chan-
nel to find the amount of entropy sourced from the mea-
surement of the vacuum state. Using the procedure de-
scribed by Haw et al. [25] for the worst-case conditional
min-entropy (Hmin) we can find a lower bound for the
maximum extractable randomness given the discretized
measured distribution Mdis, conditioned on the classi-
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Table 1: Summary of results for our three constructions. The
bitrate can be found by multiplication of sampling rate, number
of extractors, and extracted bits per sample.The min-entropy
per 8 bits for extractor C can be obtained from the reported
min-entropy per bit = 0.986 multiplied by eight.
Raw 8 Bit AES Two Source
Extractor
Channels
7 7 3
Sampling
Rate
(MSPS)
55 50 52
Bits per
Sample
8 8 × 63/128 12 ×1/72
Generation
Rate
(Gbps)
3.08 1.37 0.026
Min-
Entropy
per 8 bits
7.897 7.902 7.890
IID
Test[36]
Pass Pass Pass
Randomness
Test[42]
Pass Pass Pass
cal side information E [25, 41]:
Hmin(Mdis|E) = − log2
[
max
e∈R
max
mi∈Mdis
PMdis|E(mi|e)
]
(1)
where mi and e are the samples from their respec-
tive distributions. Taking a maximum classical noise
spread of emax = 5σE , and using a representative sam-
ple of 1× 106 samples per channel we numerically eval-
uate Equation 1 and find a worse case min entropy
of Hmin(Mdis|E) ≥ 9.201 across all seven channels,
for a near optimal digitization range. This value de-
scribes the entropy component immune to classical noise
sources; however, it does not describe the component
immune to quantum side information, as the extractors
we use are not secure against such attacks.
If each sample in a test set from a noise source is
mutually independent and have the same probability
distribution, that noise source is considered to be in-
dependent and identically distributed (IID). The NIST
SP800-90B entropy assessment package [43] uses a range
of statistical tests to attempt to prove that a sample is
not IID. If none of the tests fail, the noise source is
assumed IID. The output entropy of the raw bit extrac-
tion (A) is tested using the entropy estimate procedure
from NIST SP800-90B, and find the sample passes the
IID test with an entropy of 7.897 bits. This extrac-
tor is designed to minimise the effect of the classical
noise on the output signal. The total bit rate of this
construction is given by the product of the sample rate
(55MSPS), extracted bits per sample (8), and number
Figure 3: Correlation between the output of a single two-source
extractor and its inputs 1(a) and 2(b). Both positive (squares)
and negative (triangles) correlations are plotted, with the y-
axis shared between plots. The black dotted line represents
the correlation of perfectly random data for the sample size,
4.8× 10−4.
of channels (7), and is 3.08 Gbit/s. We sample at least
27.5 MHz of the homodyne detector bandwidth as al-
lowed by the Shannon-Hartley limit[8]. The sampling
rate is limited by the interface between the ADC and
FPGA. Thus, we generate 112 Mbit/s per MHz of sin-
gle channel detector bandwidth. We note that previous
implementations have sampled more than an order-of-
magnitude more detector bandwidth with superior de-
tectors and digitization [25], which will enable parallel
QRNG from vacuum to reach much faster rates than in
this demonstration.
Using this entropy estimate of the 8-bit raw data we
construct a vetted CMAC keyed extractor (B), taking
63 out of 128 bits of the output to ensure the number
of bits we use is less than half the input entropy. En-
tropy tests of the output give a min-entropy of 7.902
bits and the sample passes the IID test. Finally, we
measure the output entropy of our two-source extrac-
tor(C) to be 0.986 bits as it is a single bit extractor, and
it also passes the IID test. Whilst the output bit rate
is much lower because it requires two 36 bit inputs (72
raw bits total) to produce one output bit, it removes the
necessity for an externally generated seed, prevalent in
most QRNG demonstrations. The results for all three
extractors are summarized in Table 1. The NIST statis-
tical test suite [37] is also used to identify any statistical
correlations that may make the data non-random. We
run the test suite on each of our constructions over a
minimum sample size of 7×108 bits and find extraction
methods A, B, and C pass all tests.
The two-source extractor we implement is strong
given perfectly independent inputs i.e., the output is
uncorrelated to either of the inputs. We quantify the
effect of experimental imperfections in the input inde-
pendence by calculating the cross-correlation between
each input and the output as a measure of extractor
strength, shown in Fig. 3 for 4.3 × 106 samples. The
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theoretical correlation of perfectly random data for the
sample size is 4.8× 10−4.
4 Conclusion
In summary, we have demonstrated a high-speed par-
allel/ multiplexed quantum random number generator,
a configuration ideally suited to a range of platforms,
as well as capable of enhancing real time QRNG rates.
Parallelisation of random number generation is an effec-
tive way to increase the real-time bit rate of QRNG’s,
and to supply quantum random numbers to distributed
or cluster based computation and parallel communica-
tion systems. Furthermore, the parallel architecture al-
lows us to demonstrate a high-speed un-keyed strong
extraction(C) to create random numbers without the
need for an external provider of uniform random seeds.
True randomness sources that do not need a random
seed have practical security by relying only on the va-
lidity of the partially random sources, and not requiring
an external source of true randomness.
The highly specialized nature of the optical and elec-
tronic components makes a system on a single circuit
board the realistic short-term integration option for
GHz rate QRNG. To continue the scaling of this sys-
tem to hundreds of channels full integration of a high
power laser, waveguides, photodiodes, and processing
electronics on a single chip will be necessary, and sil-
icon offers a suitable platform for both electronic and
optical components [44]. The simplicity of the entropy
source makes quantum vacuum fluctuations an excel-
lent choice for parallelisation with Gbps single channel
bitrates reported.
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